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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Following a jury trial, Carl Pickens, Jr. was found guilty of rape, first degree 
kidnapping, and assault with intent to commit a serious felony (rape). In addition, he 
was determined to be a persistent violator of the law and, thus, was eligible for a 
sentencing enhancement. At his sentencing hearing, Mr. Pickens received the following 
concurrent sentences: for rape, life, with 35 years fixed; for first degree kidnapping, 25 
years, all fixed; for assault with intent to commit a serious felony (rape), ten years, all 
fixed; and, for being a persistent violator, life, with 45 years fixed. 
Mr. Pickens appeals. On appeal, he contends that: (1) his conviction and 
punishment for both the greater offense of rape, and the lesser-included offense of 
assault with intent to commit a serious felony (rape), twice placed him in jeopardy for 
the same offense and, therefore, violated both the United States and Idaho 
Constitutions; and (2) allowing the prosecutor to present argument and evidence 
implicating Mr. Pickens in certain prior bad acts was error because that evidence was 
clearly inadmissible and highly prejudicial. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Cynthia Ortiz and Tijuan Mccrary first met in 1999, when Cynthia was only 18 
years old. (Tr. Vol. V, p.191, L.23 - p.192, L.13.) Thereafter, they developed an on-
again, off-again romantic relationship (more on than off), which extended at least 
through 2007. (Tr. Vol. V, p.192, Ls.14-23.) Besides being Ms. Ortiz's boyfriend, 
Mr. Mccrary is also the biological father of the youngest of her three children, and has 
been very active in the lives of her other two children. (Tr. Vol. V, p.192, L.24 - p.194, 
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L.4, p.331, Ls.9-20, p.679, Ls.13-25.) He has supported Ms. Ortiz's children 
emotionally and financially. (Tr. Vol. V, p.193, Ls.7-24, p.680, Ls.7-25.) 
According to Ms. Ortiz, during the summer of 2006, she and Mr. Mccrary were 
"separated," such that that they were free to date other people. (Tr. Vol. V, p.194, L.10 
- p.195, L.1.) Nevertheless, Ms. Ortiz concedes that she stiff saw Mr. Mccrary, so as to 
facilitate his visitation with, and care for, her children. (Tr. Vol. V, p.195, Ls.2-7, p.203, 
Ls.15-18.) 
In early August, 2006, Ms. Ortiz, who used the stage name "Caramel" while at 
work, met Mr. Pickens at her place of employment.1 (Tr. Vol. V, p.195, L.14 - p.196, 
L.17, p.387, Ls.8-12.) Ms. Ortiz and Mr. Pickens talked for most of the night and, at the 
end of the night, exchanged phone numbers. (Tr. Vol. V, p.195, L.14 - p.197, L.13.) 
Mr. Pickens called the next morning, initiating what was to become a brief, but fairly 
intense, dating/sexual relationship. (See Tr. Vol. V, p.198, L.19-p.217, L.12.) 
1 Although the jury was never allowed to hear the full story, the fact is that Ms. Ortiz was 
an exotic dancer at the Kit Kat Klub, a "bikini bar" in Meridian, Idaho. (See R., p.27 
(State's motion in limine seeking to preclude the defense from offering any evidence 
that Ms. Ortiz was a dancer at the Kit Kat Klub); Tr. Vol. V, p.309, Ls.14-16, p.310, L.18 
- p.311, L.1 (Ms. Ortiz, explaining in an offer of proof, that she did not dance nude at 
the Kit Kat Klub).) Had the jury been allowed to hear this evidence, it might have had, 
not only a complete picture of the relationship that Ms. Ortiz had with Mr. Pickens, but 
also an alternative explanation of the bruises on Ms. Ortiz's body, which the State 
ultimately attempted to link to the alleged rape in this case. (See, e.g., Tr. Vol. V, p.282, 
L.15 - p.284, L.2.) However, the district court ruled that the nature, and place, of 
Ms. Ortiz's employment could not be mentioned by the defense because: (1) the 
defense could not prove, for sure, that the individual bruises on Ms. Ortiz's body had 
been sustained at work (Tr. Vol. I, p.41, L.8 - p.44, L.20, p.55, Ls.7-25; Tr. Vol. V, p.10, 
L.24 - p.11, L.11 ); (2) Ms. Ortiz's dancing was "past sexual behavior of an alleged 
victim" and, therefore, inadmissible under I.RE. 412 (Tr. Vol. V, p.321, L.24 - p.322, 
L.5, p.491, L.14 - p.492, L.8); and (3) Ms. Ortiz's exotic dancing was unfairly prejudicial 
to the State (Tr. Vol. V, p.321, L. 10 - p.322, L.5). 
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On August 11, 2006, while Ms. Ortiz was separated from Mr. Mccrary and, by 
that time, dating Mr. Pickens, she brought Mr. Pickens with her while dropping off her 
children at Mr. McCrary's home. (See Tr. Vol. V, p.204, L.3 - p.205, L.7.) Not 
surprisingly, Mr. Mccrary was not happy to see Mr. Pickens with Ms. Ortiz and the 
children he was helping her to raise. (Tr. Vol. V, p.207, L.24 - p.208, L.3.) He became 
very upset, pacing and raising his voice as he told Ms. Ortiz not to bring Mr. Pickens 
around anymore. (Tr. Vol. V, p.210, L.4 - p.211, L.16.) Mr. Mccrary was so agitated 
that Ms. Ortiz was afraid a fight would break out, and she felt compelled to get between 
the two men. (Tr. Vol. V, p.210, L.4 - p.211, L.16.) 
In the early morning hours of Sunday, August 13, 2006, after finishing a Saturday 
night shift a work, Ms. Ortiz went to Mr. Pickens' home. (Tr. Vol. V, p.215, Ls.9-17, 
p.216, Ls.10-14.) When she arrived, she and Mr. Pickens had what she concedes was 
consensual sex. (Tr. Vol. V, p.217, Ls.1-12.) 
According to Ms. Ortiz, when she and Mr. Pickens awoke on Sunday morning, 
Mr. Pickens began to question her about her feelings for Mr. Mccrary. (Tr. Vol. V, 
p.221, Ls.6-16.) In response, Ms. Ortiz admitted that she was still in love with him.2 
(Tr. Vol. V, p.221, Ls.6-16.) Ms. Ortiz claims that this response caused Mr. Pickens to 
become angry; she says that he repeatedly shoved her, refused to allow her to leave 
(until she had sex with him), attempted to undress her even though she was screaming 
2 Indeed, Ms. Ortiz concedes that she never stopped loving Mr. Mccrary, even through 
multiple breakups, including one where she was impregnated by another man, and 
another one where she was dating and sleeping with Mr. Pickens. (Tr. Vol. V, p.331, 
Ls.15-19, p.332, Ls.8-15.) In fact, by the time of Mr. Pickens' trial, Ms. Ortiz and 
Mr. Mccrary were not only back together, but were actually living together. (Tr. Vol. V, 
p.681, Ls.7-19, p.706, Ls9-11.) At trial, she testified that she sometimes refers to 
Mr. Mccrary as her husband. (Tr. Vol. V, p.340, Ls.10-13.) 
3 
and fighting him physically, put a handgun in her mouth and threatened to shoot her if 
she did not stop struggling, and eventually had intercourse with her. (Tr. Vol. V, p.22, 
L.4 - p.236, L.1.) Afterward, Ms. Ortiz says, Mr. Pickens still would not allow her to 
leave for some time. (Tr. Vol. V, p.238, L.21 - p.242, L.23, p.253, L.8 - p.264, L.17.) 
However, when she did leave, she immediately drove to Mr. McCrary's home, where 
she told Mr. Mccrary that Mr. Pickens had raped her. (Tr. Vol. V, p.265, L.25 - p.272, 
L.15.) Mr. Mccrary then called the police. (Tr. Vol. V, p.272, Ls.16-24.) 
On September 12, 2006, a grand jury indicted Mr. Pickens on one count of rape, 
one count of first degree kidnapping, and one count of assault with intent to commit a 
serious felony (rape). (R., pp.8-9.) Later, the State filed an Information Part II, alleging 
that Mr. Pickens is a persistent violator of the law within the meaning of I.C. § 19-2514. 
(R., pp.44--46.) 
Mr. Pickens exercised his constitutional right to a jury trial, and that trial ran from 
April 30, 2007, through May 4, 2007. (See generally R., pp.96-140; Tr. Vol. V.) At trial, 
the State's theory was that Mr. Pickens flew into a jealous rage when he learned that his 
new girlfriend was still in love with another man, and that this rage caused him to 
commit a host of crimes against Ms. Ortiz, including the crime of rape. (See, e.g., 
Tr. Vol. V, p.144, L.20 - p.146, L.15, p.930, Ls.9-14.) In contrast, the defense theorized 
that the rape allegations were fabricated by Ms. Ortiz in an effort to avoid having to 
admit to Mr. Mccrary that she had had sex with Mr. Pickens. (See, e.g., Tr. Vol. V, 
p.168, Ls.3-16.) 
At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found Mr. Pickens guilty of all three charged 
offenses. (R., pp.139, 141--46; Supp. Tr., p.1017, L.11 - p.1019, L.20.) The jury also 
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found that Mr. Pickens had two prior felony convictions, thereby making him a persistent 
violator of the law within the meaning of I.C. § 19-2514. (R., pp.140, 147; Supp. 
Tr., p.1030, L.17-p.1031, L.5.) 
On July 19, 2007, the district court held a sentencing hearing. (See generally 
R., pp.152-53; Tr. Vol. I, pp.84-118.) At the conclusion of that hearing, it orally 
pronounced the following sentences: for rape, a sentence of life, with 35 years fixed; for 
first degree kidnapping, a sentence of 25 years, all fixed; for assault with intent to 
commit a serious felony (rape), a sentence of ten years, all fixed; and, for being a 
persistent violator of the law, a sentence of life, with 45 years fixed.3 (Tr. Vol. I, p.116, 
L.15 - p.117, L.5.) All four sentences were ordered to run concurrently. (Tr. Vol. I, 
p.116, L.15-p.117, L.5.) 
On July 23, 2007, the district court filed a Judgment of Conviction and 
Commitment. (R., pp.154-57.) Notably, because the Judgment of Conviction and 
Commitment described sentences which were different than those that had been orally 
pronounced just four days earlier (see R., pp.154-57),4 the sentences described therein 
3 Mr. Pickens is mindful of the fact that the sentence pronounced for the persistent 
violator enhancement is illegal, in that a persistent violator enhancement is not a 
separate charge for which a separate sentence may be imposed. Lopez v. State, 108 
Idaho 394, 395-96, 700 P.2d 16, 17-18 (1985); State v. Pierce, 107 Idaho 96, 107, 685 
P.2d 837, 848 (Ct. App. 1984). Mr. Pickens, therefore, may file a motion, pursuant to 
I.C.R. 35, to have that illegal sentence corrected. 
4 The sentences described in the Judgment of Conviction and Commitment was as 
follows: for rape (as enhanced by the persistent violator finding), a sentence of life, with 
45 years fixed; for first degree kidnapping, a sentence of life, with 25 years fixed; and for 
assault with intent to commit a serious felony (rape), a sentence of ten years, all fixed. 
(R., pp.155-56.) The district court did not seek to impose a separate sentence for the 
persistent violator enhancement this time. ( See R., pp.154-57.) 
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have no legal effect. State v. Timbana, 145 Idaho 779, 782, 186 P.3d 635, 638 (2008); 
State v. McCool, 139 Idaho 804,806 n.1, 87 P.3d 291,293 n.1 (2004). 
On August 17, 2007, Mr. Pickens filed a timely Notice of Appeal. (R., pp.159-63.) 
On appeal, Mr. Pickens contends that: (1) his conviction and punishment for both the 
greater offense of rape, and the lesser-included offense. of assault with intent to commit 
a serious felony (rape), twice placed him in jeopardy for the same offense and, 
therefore, violated both the United States and Idaho Constitutions; and (2) allowing the 
prosecutor to present argument and evidence implicating Mr. Pickens in certain prior 




1. Was Mr. Pickens twice placed in jeopardy for the same offense when he was 
convicted and sentenced for both the greater offense of rape, and the lesser-
included offense of assault with intent to commit a serious felony (rape)? 
2. Was it error to permit the State to offer evidence and argument implicating 
Mr. Pickens in certain prior bad acts, where that evidence was clearly 




Mr. Pickens Was Twice Put In Jeopardy For the Same Offense When He Was 
Convicted Of, And Sentenced For, The Greater Offense Of Rape, As Well As The 
Lesser-Included Offense Of Assault With Intent To Commit A Serious Felony (Rape) 
A. Introduction 
As noted, the Indictment in this case charged Mr. Pickens with three felonies: 
rape, first degree kidnapping, and assault with intent to commit a serious felony (rape). 
(R., pp.8-9.) Mr. Pickens went to trial on all three charges, and was ultimately found 
guilty of all of them. (R., pp.141-46.) Thereafter, Mr. Pickens received three concurrent 
prison sentences for the three offenses. (Tr. Vol. I, p.116, L.15 - p.117, L.5.) 
Mr. Pickens contends that his rights under the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the 
Idaho Constitution and the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution were 
violated when he was charged with, convicted of, and punished for the greater offense 
of rape, as well as the lesser-included offense of assault with intent to commit a serious 
felony (rape). 
8. Standard Of Review 
Because double jeopardy claims are grounded in the Fifth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution and Article I, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution, they 
present questions of law which are subject to free review. State v. Byington, 139 Idaho 
516, 518, 81 P.3d 421,423 (Ct. App. 2003). 
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C. Mr. Pickens Was Twice Placed In JeopardyFor The Same Offense 
The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution states that "[n]o person 
shall be ... subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb."5 
This "Double Jeopardy Clause 'protects against a second prosecution for the same 
offense after acquittal. It protects against a second prosecution for the same offense 
after conviction. And it protects against multiple punishments for the same offense."' 
Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 165 (1977) (quoting North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 
711, 717 (1969)). Likewise, Article I, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution provides that 
"[ri]o person shall be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense." 
In interpreting the Fifth Amendment, the United States Supreme Court has held 
that a greater offense and a lesser-included offense are "the same offense" within the 
meaning of the Double Jeopardy Clause and, thus, cannot be twice prosecuted or twice 
punished. Brown, 432 U.S. at 168-69. See also State v. Thompson, 101 Idaho 430, 
433, 614 P.2d 970, 973 (1980) ("The prohibition against double jeopardy has been held 
to mean that defendant may not be convicted of both a greater and lesser included 
offense."). 
"There are two theories under which a particular offense may be determined to 
be a lesser included offense." State v. Curtis, 130 Idaho 522, 524, 944 P.2d 119, 121 
(1996). Under the "statutory theory," an offense is a lesser-included offense of the 
greater offense if it is impossible to commit the greater offense without also committing 
the lesser offense in the process.· Id. In contrast, under the "pleading theory," an 
5 The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment is applicable to the states 
through the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Brown v. Ohio, 
432 U.S. 161, 164 (1977). 
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offense is a lesser-included offense "if it is alleged in the information as a means or 
element of the commission of the higher offense." Id. Since Idaho has adopted the 
broader "pleading theory," Thompson, 101 Idaho at 433-34, 614 P.2d at 973-74, "an 
'included offense' [in Idaho] is one which is necessarily committed in the commission of 
another offense; or one, the essential elements of which are charged in the information 
as the manner or means by which the offense was committed." Id. at 43, 614 P.2d at 
974 (quoting State v. Hall, 86 Idaho 63, 69, 383 P.2d 602, 605-06 (1963)). 
Regardless of whether it is the "statutory" or "pleading" theory that applies 
though, Mr. Pickens contends that the assault for which he was convicted and 
sentenced was a lesser-included offense of the crime of rape, for which he was also 
convicted and sentenced. Under a "statutory" theory, the Idaho courts have long held 
that assault with intent to commit rape is a lesser included offenses of rape because it is 
impossible to commit a (non-statutory) rape without also committing an assault in the 
process. See, e.g., State v. Bolton, 119 Idaho 846,850,810 P.2d 1132, 1136 (Ct. App. 
1991) (agreeing with the defendant-appellant that "assault with intent to commit rape is 
a lesser included offense of rape, and ... assault with intent to commit rape or battery 
with intent to commit rape can be shown to be a lesser included offense only by proof of 
all the elements of rape, except penetration"); State v. Huggins, 103 Idaho 422, 425, 
648 P.2d 1135, 1138 (Ct. App. 1982) ("In Idaho, the crime of 'assault with intent to 
commit rape' (LC. § 18-907) is a lesser included offense of rape and, in prosecuting 
such an assault, the state must prove all elements of rape except penetration."), 
reversed on other grounds, 105 Idaho 43, 665 P.2d 1053 (1983); State v. Gamey, 45 
Idaho 768, 265 P.2d 668, 669 (1928) (holding that "the crime of assault with intent to 
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commit rape is an offense included within the crime of rape," for reasons previously 
stated by the Utah Supreme Court: "The crime of rape cannot be perpetrated without 
first committing an assault. The assault always precedes the completed offense of 
rape. These things are so under our statute."); State v. Neil, 13 Idaho 539, 90 P.2d 860, 
863 (1907) ("In order to warrant a conviction of the crime of Assault with intent to 
commit rape, the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt every essential element 
of the rape except the final consummation of the act.").6 
Under a "pleading" theory as well, the assault with intent to commit a serious 
felony (rape) charged in this case was a lesser included offense of the alleged rape. 
This is so because the essential elements of that assault were charged in the 
information as the manner or means by which the rape was committed. The essential 
elements of assault with intent to commit a serious felony (rape) are that, with the intent 
of raping Cynthia Ortiz, Mr. Pickens either attempted to commit a violent injury on her 
person and had the apparent ability to do so, or he intentionally and unlawfully 
threatened her (by word or act) with violence, had the apparent ability to carry out that 
threat, and created a well-founded fear (of imminent violence) in Ms. Ortiz in the 
process.7 I.C. §§ 18-901, 18-909. This is precisely the manner or means by which 
6 Just as · assault with intent to commit a serious felony (rape) is a lesser included 
offense of rape, attempted rape· is a lesser included offense of assault with intent to 
commit a serious felony (rape). State v. Bates, 106 Idaho 395, 399, 679 P.2d 672, 676 
~Ct. App. 1984); State v. Hall, 88 Idaho 117, 122-23, 397 P.2d 261, 263-64 (1964). 
Specifically, the Indictment charged that Mr. Pickens committed an assault (Count Ill) 
as follows: 
That the defendant . . . did intentionally, unlawfully, and with apparent 
ability, threaten by word or act to do violence upon the person of Cynthia 
0., with the intent to commit rape, by battering and physically 
overpowering Cynthia 0. After she refused to have sex with him, and then 
shoving a handgun in to her mouth .... 
11 
Mr. Pickens was alleged to have committed a rape of Ms. Ortiz. Namely, Mr. Pickens 
was alleged to have successfully raped Ms. Ortiz by threatening her with violence, while 
at the same time having the apparent ability to carry out those threats: 
That the defendant ... did penetrate the vaginal opening of Cynthia 0., a 
female person, with his penis, and where Cynthia O was prevented from 
resistance by threats of immediate and great bodily harm, accompanied 
by the apparent power of execution, to-wit: the defendant physically 
battered Cynthia 0. and/or shoved a hand gun into her mouth, threatening 
to harm her. 
(R., pp.8-9.) Accordingly, a review of the Indictment itself reveals that the alleged 
assault in this case was a lesser included offense of the alleged rape. See Bolton, 119 
Idaho at 849-50, 810 P.2d at 1135-36 (holding that where the rape for which the 
defendant was convicted had been charged as "by force or violence, accomplish[ing] an 
act of intercourse ... by overcoming the resistance" of the victim, "[c]learly the state 
alleged that battery was 'manner or means' by which the rape was accomplished," such 
that battery with intent to commit a serious felony (rape) was a lesser-included offense 
of rape under the pleading theory). 
Since assault with intent to commit a serious felony (rape) was a lesser included 
offense of rape, it was an impermissible double jeopardy violation for Mr. Pickens to 
have been convicted and punished for both. See Brown, 432 U.S. at 168-69; 
Thompson, 101 Idaho at 433,614 P.2d at 973. 
D. Mr. Pickens' Claim Is Properly Before This Court 
Mr. Pickens acknowledges that no objection, motion to dismiss, or motion for 
acquittal was made in the district court regarding the separate charges of rape and 
(R., p.9.) 
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assault with intent to commit a serious felony (rape). However, an appellate court may 
always review "fundamental" errors made by district courts, even where no objection to 
those errors was made below. State v. Rozajewski, 130 Idaho 644, 645, 945 P.2d 
1390, 1391 (Ct. App. 1997). "A fundamental error is one that so profoundly distorts the 
proceedings that it produces manifest injustice, depriving the criminal defendant of the 
fundamental right to due process." Id. It "goes to the foundation or basis of a 
defendant's rights, goes to the foundation of the case, or takes from the defendant a 
right which was essential to his or her defense and which no court could or ought to 
permit to be waived." Id. 
It is well-established that double jeopardy claims are assertions of fundamental 
error. See State v. Hussain, 143 Idaho 175, 176-78, 139 P.3d 777, 778-80 (Ct. App. 
2006) (addressing the merits of the defendant-appellant's double jeopardy claim under 
a fundamental error theory because those arguments had not been preserved below); 
State v. Swader, 137 Idaho 733, 736, 52 P.3d 878, 881 (Ct. App. 2002) (observing that 
even where there was no objection below, "review is proper upon a determination of 
fundamental error," then stating that it would review the defendant's double jeopardy 
claim, thereby implicitly holding that that claim did assert "fundamental error''); State v. 
Ayala, 129 Idaho 911, 919-920, 935 P.2d 174, 182-183 (Ct. App. 1996) (implicitly 
agreeing that double jeopardy claims are, in fact, claims of fundamental error by 
acknowledging that the appellant had not raised such a claim below, but, nevertheless 
reaching the issue on appeal).8 This makes sense, given that the right to not be put 
8 Swader and Ayala were recently cited by the Court of Appeals of for the proposition 
that double jeopardy violations may constitute fundamental errors. See State v. Flegel, 
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twice in jeopardy for the same offense is a basic right specifically and unequivocally 
guaranteed by both the United States and the Idaho Constitutions. Thus, regardless of 
whether such a claim was raised in the district court, and Mr. Pickens acknowledges 
that it was not, it can now be made on appeal because it raises a question of 
fundamental error.9 
11. 
The District Court Erred In Permitting The State To Offer Evidence And Argument 
Implicating Mr. Pickens Jn Certain Prior Bad Acts Because That Evidence Was Clearly 
Inadmissible And Highly Prejudicial To Mr. Pickens' Defense 
A. Introduction 
During the opening statement phase of Mr. Pickens' trial, the prosecutor informed 
the jury that it would hear evidence that, immediately after the alleged rape, Mr. Pickens 
told a nearby witness that "[t]his time it's not my fault." (Tr. Vol. V, p.151, Ls.5-13 
(emphasis added).) Although defense counsel objected to this portion of the 
prosecutor's opening statement (and even moved for a mistrial) on the basis that the 
2007 WL 4247653, *8 (Ct. App. Dec. 7, 2007), rev. granted, 2007 WL 4247653 (Idaho 
Dec 05, 2007). 
9 While the Idaho Criminal Rules require that "[m]otion[s] to dismiss based upon former 
jeopardy" must be made prior to trial, !.C.R. 12(b)(6), and that a failure to timely make 
one of the motions that must be made before trial generally constitutes a waiver of the 
issues raised in such a motion, I.C.R. 12(f), the Idaho Court of Appeals has held that 
these provisions do not preclude a defendant from raising a subsequent double 
jeopardy challenge to his conviction and punishment for a greater offense and a lesser 
included offense in the same case. Bates, 106 Idaho at 402, 679 P.2d at 679. The 
Court of Appeals correctly reasoned in Bates that, where the two convictions and 
punishments in question occur "in the same proceeding," there is no ''former" jeopardy 
within the meaning of Rule 12. Id. (emphasis in original). Moreover, Rule 12 provides 
for the orderly resolution of cases in the district court, not on appeal; thus, even if it 
precluded a last-minute motion for dismissal in the district court, it ought not to be read 
to preclude Mr. Pickens from raising a question of fundamental error before this Court. 
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State had failed to provide any prior notice of its intent to use evidence of prior bad acts, 
as is clearly required by I.R.E. 404(b) (Tr. Vol. V, p.161, Ls.6-22), the district court 
impliedly found the prosecutor's argument to be proper, and it denied the motion for a 
mistrial. (See Tr. Vol. V, p.161, L.163, L.18 - p.164, L.20.) Later, during the State's 
presentation of its case-in-chief, the prosecutor elicited testimony from two witnesses to 
the effect that Mr. Pickens had made the "this time it's not my fault" comment. (See, 
e.g., Tr. Vol. V, p.242, L.24 - p.244, L.4, p.416, Ls.1-7, p.416, Ls.14-22.) 
On appeal, Mr. Pickens asserts two claims related to the arguments and 
evidence concerning his alleged statement that "this time, it's not my fault": first, he 
contends that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by revealing the alleged quote to 
the jury, knowing that no prior notice had been given in accordance with I.R.E. 404(b); 
second, he asserts that the district court's ruling as to the admissibility of such evidence 
was in error-both because the State failed to provide prior notice of its intent to use the 
evidence, and because the evidence is irrelevant or, if somewhat relevant, its probative 
value is substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect. 
B. Relevant Facts 
During her opening statement, the prosecutor asserted that Mr. Pickens' sixteen 
year-old cousin, Rachel, peeked into Mr. Pickens' bedroom shortly after the alleged 
rape occurred there, and that Rachel looked "afraid" and was "thinking 'What's going 
on?"' (Tr. Vol. V, p.150, Ls.17-22, p.151, L.6.) The prosecutor then went on to say that 
Mr. Pickens addressed his cousin as follows: "See, see, come in. See, this time it's not 
my fault." (Tr. Vol. V, p.151, Ls.5-13 (emphasis added).) 
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Outside the presence of the jury, defense counsel objected to the prosecutor's 
. reference to Mr. Pickens' alleged statement that "this time it's not my fault." (Tr. Vol. V, 
p.161, ls.6-13.) Defense counsel argued that the implication of such a statement was 
that this sort of thing (an alleged rape) had occurred previously and, therefore, fell within 
the ambit of I.RE. 404(b) (Tr. Vol. V, p.161, ls.6-13, p.163, Ls.6-17), which, of course, 
limits the use of evidence of prior crimes, wrongs, or other acts to prove the character of 
a person in order to show that the person acted in conformity therewith, I.RE. 404(b). 
Defense counsel argued that such evidence could not be admitted in this case since the 
State had provided no prior notice (as is specifically required by I.RE. 404(b)) of its 
intent to use that evidence during trial. (See Tr. Vol. V, p.161, Ls.13-15, p.163, Ls.6-8, 
15-17.) Furthermore, he moved the district court for mistrial based on the prosecutor's 
argument. (Tr. Vol. V, p.161, Ls.15-22.) 
The prosecutor responded to defense counsel's objection and motion by arguing 
that her recitation of Mr. Pickens' alleged statement was offered to show how strangely 
Mr. Pickens' was behaving immediately after the alleged rape 10; the prosecutor stated 
her willingness to concede that Mr. Pickens never hit Ms. Ortiz before; and the 
prosecutor sought to justify her opening statement on the basis that "those are the 
words that the defendant spoke .... " (Tr. Vol. V, p.161, L.24 - p.162, L.22.) 
10 Notably, the prosecutor did not seek to have the statement admitted on the basis that 
it showed Mr. Pickens to have been acting strangely in the sense that he became 
defensive in the face of any sort of allegations of wrongdoing; rather, she sought to 
have the statement admitted on the basis that it showed Mr. Pickens to have been 
acting strangely in the sense that "the words" made "no sense to the victim because 
they [sic] had never happened before," this was part of Mr. Pickens' "rage," and this 
demonstrated that Mr. Pickens "has acted completely out of normal behavior .... " 
(Tr. Vol. V, p.161, L.25-p.162, L.22.) 
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The district court adopted the prosecutor's claim that the purpose for her 
recitation of Mr. Pickens' alleged statement was to show that Mr. Pickens behaved 
uncharacteristically: "the Court will specifically find that the entire thrust of the State's 
argument ... was this came out of nowhere. There had been no such problems before. 
And there was no issue that it had occurred before. She [Ms. Ortiz] was taken totally by 
surprise by what happened. This was the focus of the opening statement of the State." 
(Tr. Vol. V, p.164, Ls.1-12.) Accordingly, the district court ruled that the prosecutor's 
argument was not "the type of statement that entitles the defense to a mistrial." (Tr. Vol. 
V, p.163, Ls.18-22.) Although it did not rule on the issue of the State's failure to provide 
prior notice of this evidence of a prior bad act by Mr. Pickens, the district court did, 
express a willingness to instruct the jury that "there is no issue here with regard to any 
prior violence between the defendant and the alleged victim."11 (Tr. Vol. V, p.163, L.18 
-p.164, L.1, p.164, Ls.15-20.) 
Later, during the presentation of its case-in-chief, the State presented evidence 
reminding the jury of what Mr. Pickens had allegedly told his cousin. (See, e.g., Tr. Vol. 
V, p.242, L.24 - p.244, L.4 (Ms. Ortiz testifying that Rachel asked: "What are you 
doing? She wants to go home," and that Mr. Pickens then responded: "I didn't do 
anything this time. She attacked me.")12; p.416, Ls.1-7 (Rachel testifying as follows: "I 
11 Defense counsel did not request that the jury be so instructed. (Tr. Vol. V, p.164, 
Ls.15-21.) Perhaps the reason he did not request such an instruction was that, as he 
had already noted, it would be impossible to "unring that bell." (Tr. VoL V, p.161, Ls.15-
17.) Alternatively, counsel may have felt that such an instruction would have 'simply led 
the jury to believe that there had been prior violence between the defendant and 
someone else, a conclusion that would have been just as prejudicial to Mr. Pickens as 
the belief that there had been prior violence between Mr. Pickens and Ms. Ortiz. 
12 Apparently following Up on her earlier-stated reason for offering this evidence, the 
prosecutor then asked Ms. Ortiz, "to be clear," whether Mr. Pickens had ever hit her 
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said that Cynthia wants to go home. And he said that he didn't do it this time .... "); 
p.416, Ls.14-22 (prosecutor asking, "[y]ou just now said he said, 'I didn't do it this time,' 
and he pulled his lip down," and Rachel responding affirmatively three times).) 
C. Standards Of Review 
As noted, Mr. Pickens asserts two claims related to arguments and evidence 
concerning his alleged statement that "this time, it's not my fault": first, he contends that 
the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by revealing the alleged quote to the jury, 
knowing that no prior notice had been given in accordance with I.RE. 404(b); second, 
he asserts that the district court's ruling as to the admissibility of such evidence was in 
error. With regard to each claim, the applicable standard of review is described below. 
1. Standard Of Review Applicable To Prosecutorial Misconduct Claim 
Because Mr. Pickens not only objected when the prosecutor discussed 
Mr. Pickens' alleged statement that "this time, it's not my fault", but also moved for a 
mistrial, the applicable standard of review is as follows: 
When there is a motion for mistrial based upon prosecutorial error 
supported by a contemporaneous objection to the underlying procedural 
or evidentiary error we review the denial of a motion for mistrial for 
reversible error. 
[T]he question on appeal is not whether the trial judge 
reasonably exercised his discretion in light of circumstances 
existing when the mistrial motion was made. Rather, the 
question must be whether the event which precipitated the 
motion for mistrial represented reversible error when viewed 
in the context of the full record. Thus, where a motion for 
mistrial has been denied in a criminal case, the "abuse of 
discretion" standard is a misnomer. The standard, more 
before, and Ms. Ortiz responded in the negative. (See Tr. Vol. V, p.244, Ls.5-8.) Thus, 
the natural inference is that Mr. Pickens had been involved in a similar incident with 
someone else on a prior occasion. 
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accurately stated, is one of reversible error. Our focus is 
upon the continuing impact on the trial of the incident that 
triggered the mistrial motion. The trial judge's refusal to 
declare a mistrial will be disturbed only if that incident, 
viewed retrospectively, constituted reversible error. 
When there has been a contemporaneous objection we determine 
factually if there was prosecutorial misconduct, then we determine 
whether the error was harmless. 
State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 571, 165 P.3d 273, 285 (2007) (citations omitted). 
2. Standard Of Review Applicable To Claim Of Evidentiary Error 
Generally speaking, "[t]he admission of evidence is committed to the discretion of 
the trial court." Herrera v. Estay, _ Idaho _, 201 P.3d 647, 653 (2009). Thus, an 
appellate court will generally review the district court's evidentiary rulings for an abuse 
of discretion. Id. 
When an exercise of discretion is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court 
conducts a multi-tiered inquiry. The sequence of the inquiry is (1) whether 
the lower court rightly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether 
the court acted within the outer boundaries of such discretion and 
consistently with any legal standards applicable to specific choices; and 
(3) whether the court reached its decision by an exercise of reason. 
State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598,600, 768 P.2d 1331, 1333 (1989). 
D. The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct When. During Her Opening Statement, 
She Quoted Mr. Pickens As Saying That "This Time It's Not My Fault," Knowing 
That The State Had Not Provided Any Notice Of Its Intent To Use Evidence Of 
Prior Bad Acts 
Mr. Pickens contends that his right to a fair trial13 and his right to due process of 
law14 were abridged through the prosecutor's opening statement in this case. As noted 
above, during her opening statement, the prosecutor argued that Mr. Pickens' sixteen 
13 See U.S. CONST. amends. VI, XIV; IDAHO CONST., art. I§ 13. 
14 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; IDAHO CONST., art. I§ 13. 
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year-old cousin, Rachel, peeked into Mr. Pickens' bedroom shortly after the alleged 
rape occurred there, and that Rachel looked "afraid" and was "thinking 'What's going 
on?"' (Tr. Vol. V, p.150, Ls.17-22, p.151, L.6.) The prosecutor then went on to say that 
Mr. Pickens addressed his cousin as follows: "See, see, come in. See, this time it's not 
my fault." (Tr. Vol. V, p.151, Ls.5-13 (emphasis added).) 
As noted, outside the presence of the jury, defense counsel objected to the 
prosecutor's reference to Mr. Pickens' alleged statement that "this time it's not my fault." 
(Tr. Vol. V, p.161, Ls.6-13.) Defense counsel argued that the reference was improper 
because the implication was that Mr. Pickens had previously been involved in a similar 
attack or rape, and the statement, therefore, fell within the ambit of I.R.E. 404(b) and 
could not be admitted in this case since the State had provided no prior notice (as is 
specifically required by I.R.E. 404(b)) of its intent to use that statement during trial. 
(See Tr. Vol. V, p.161, Ls.6-15, p.163, Ls.6-17.) Counsel also moved the district court 
for mistrial. (Tr. Vol. V, p.161, Ls.15-22.) 
In Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731 (1969), the United States Supreme Court held 
that there was no prosecutorial misconduct, and the defendant was not denied his right 
to confront the witnesses against him, where the prosecutor's opening statement 
paraphrased the expected testimony of a certain witness but, at trial, the prosecutor was 
unable to produce said testimony because the witness in question exercised his Fifth 
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Id. at 737. In reaching its ultimate 
conclusion in that case, the Frazier Court undertook an ad hoc analysis, seemingly 
focusing on two factors: the prejudice to the defendant, and the culpability of the 
prosecutor. See id. at 735-37. It certainly did not announce a bright-line rule. In fact, it 
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specifically noted that "[i]t may be that some remarks in opening or closing statement 
could be so prejudicial that a finding of error, or even constitutional error, would be 
unavoidable." Id. at 736. 
Frazier, of course, dealt with the question of whether it is reversible misconduct 
for a prosecutor to highlight in his opening statement relatively non-prejudicial evidence 
that he reasonably believes he will be able to present at trial; it did not involve and, 
therefore, did not answer, the question of whether it is reversible misconduct for a 
prosecutor to highlight highly prejudicial evidence that she knows, or should know, will 
not be admissible at trial. Mr. Pickens contends that the answer to the latter question-
which, of course, is the question at issue in this case-is that such behavior is 
reversible misconduct. Applying the two-factored test of Frazier, it is apparent that: (a) 
the prosecutor in this case was highly culpable and, thus, committed misconduct when 
she highlighted inadmissible evidence during her opening statement; and (b) owing to 
the nature of the improperly highlighted evidence, as well as the degree to which it was 
emphasized for the jury, the misconduct was highly prejudicial. Accordingly, 
Mr. Pickens contends that he is entitled to a new trial. 
1. The Prosecutor's Remarks Constituted Misconduct 
Although the United States Supreme Court has never explicitly held that it is 
misconduct for a prosecutor to highlight in her opening statement evidence which she 
knows, or should know, is inadmissible under the rules of evidence, there can be little 
doubt that such a tactic is improper. American Bar Association standards, for example, 
expressly prohibit such a tactic: 
The prosecutor's opening statement should be confined to a statement of the 
issues in the case and the evidence the prosecutor intends to offer which the 
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prosecutor believes in good faith will be available and admissible. A 
prosecutor should not allude to any evidence unless there is a good faith and 
reasonable basis for believing that such evidence will be tendered and 
admitted in evidence. 
American Bar Association, Prosecution Function Standard 3-5.5 (available at 
<http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/standards/pfunc_b1k.html#5.5>) (emphasis added). 
Moreover, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that it is improper to cite to 
inadmissible evidence in an opening statement. See, e.g., Walker v. Wood, 59 F.3d 
177, 1995 WL 383406, *1 (9th Cir. 1995) (unpublished opinion) ("It is generally improper 
to refer to inadmissible evidence, including evidence admissible for impeachment 
purposes, during opening statements."); United States v. Taren-Pa/ma, 997 F.2d 525, 
532 (9th Cir. 1993) (finding opening statement improper where counsel for co-defendant 
recited a statement, later ruled inadmissible, implicating the defendant in the dealing of 
"lots and lots of cocaine") (cited with approval in United States v. McCabe, 131 F.3d 
149, 1997 WL 753348 (9th Cir. 1997) (unpublished opinion)), overruled, in part, on other 
grounds by United States v. Shabani, 513 U.S. 10 (1994). Compare United States v. 
McCoy, 90 Fed. Appx. 201, 205 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding no misconduct where the 
prosecutor sought express prior approval from the district court before mentioning the 
disputed evidence in her opening statement). Finally, although it did so only in dictum, 
even the Idaho Supreme Court has made it clear that a prosecutor may not discuss 
inadmissible evidence in her opening statement. In Mattson v. Bryan, 92 Idaho 587, 
448 P.2d 201 (1968), the Court, relying on authority from a sister state, discussed some 
of the limitations on opening statements: 
A general discussion of the scope and function of the opening 
statement of counsel is set forth in Miller v. Braun, 196 Kan. 313,411 P.2d 
621 (1966): 
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"Generally speaking, counsel may outline in his 
opening statement what he expects to prove unless it is 
manifest that such proof would be incompetent, or the 
statement is made for the purpose of creating prejudice. . .. 
The rule is stated in 53 Am. Jur., Trial § 456, p.358, as 
follows: 
'"It is generally held that statements by counsel that 
certain evidence will be introduced are not improper if made 
in good faith and with reasonable ground to believe that the 
evidence is admissible, even though the intended proof 
referred to is afterward excluded .... "' 
Mattson, 92 Idaho at 592, 448 P.2d at 206 (emphasis added). 
In light of the foregoing, Mr. Pickens submits that it was misconduct for the 
prosecutor to highlight in her opening statement evidence which she knew, or should 
have known, was inadmissible (for the reasons set forth in subsection E, below), and 
the district court, therefore, erred in denying Mr. Pickens' motion for a mistrial. 
2. The Prosecutor's Remarks Were Highly Prejudicial 
This is a classic "he said-she said" type of case, where the only real evidence 
that the government had to offer the jury was the testimony of the alleged victim, 
M!S. Ortiz. Accordingly, the State's ability to portray Ms. Ortiz as a credible witness was 
critical to its obtaining the convictions it sought 
Unfortunately for the State, Ms. Ortiz had a severe credibility problem going into 
this case. While Ms. Ortiz was dating Mr. Pickens, she was still in love with, and at 
least somewhat still involved with, her ex-boyfriend-Tijuan Mccrary. Undoubtedly, she 
would have jumped at the chance to get back together with him. (See Tr. Vol. V, p.681, 
Ls.7-19, p.706, Ls9-11 (testimony that Ms. Ortiz and Mr. Mccrary had since gotten back 
together).) Thus, Ms. Ortiz had an incentive to lie, claiming that she was raped by 
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Mr. Pickens, in order to hide from Mccrary the fact that she had had consensual sex 
with another man.15 See Olden v. Kentucky, 488 U.S. 227, 232 (1988) (recognizing that 
a jury could believe that a woman falsified a rape allegation in order to hide her in 
fidelity). By so lying, Ms. Ortiz may have felt that she was increasing her chances of 
winning Mr. Mccrary back. Such a misguided approach may have seemed especially 
attractive once she saw how Mr. Mccrary had reacted when she brought Mr. Pickens to 
Mr. McCrary's home, as she may have viewed that reaction as one of jealousy, thus 
indicating that Mr. Mccrary still had feelings for her. 
Since Ms. Ortiz's credibility would have already been tarnished in the jurors' 
eyes, there is a substantial probability that those jurors were on the verge of not 
accepting her version of events-the only real evidence of any crimes having been 
committed-and, thus, there is a substantial probability that they were on the verge of 
not finding Mr. Pickens guilty of the charged offenses. However, when the jurors heard 
the prosecutor's argument (and, later, the testimony underlying that argument) 
indicating that Mr. Pickens had said "this time it's not my fault," they would have viewed 
that as proof positive that Mr. Pickens had previously committed crimes similar to those 
that were charged in this case, and they would have inferred that, as a general 
proposition, Mr. Pickens is a violent rapist. Believing Mr. Pickens to have a propensity 
for the type of crimes that were charged in this case, the jurors would have been much 
15 While Ms. Ortiz ultimately admitted that she had had consensual sex with Mr. Pickens 
prior to the alleged rape, that admission does not in any way diminish the inference that 
she lied in order to hide her consensual sexual activity with Mr. Pickens from 
Mr. Mccrary. Indeed, once a false rape allegation has been made, the complaining 
witness obviously has every incentive to do whatever she can to "sell'' her lie (including 
revealing facts that may be embarrassing or may alienate a loved one) in order to avoid 
criminal charges that may be brought against her for filing a false police report. 
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more willing to accept Ms. Ortiz's allegations as true. See I.RE. 404 (implicitly 
recognizing that evidence of a person's prior bad acts or bad character generally is 
something which, although not probative of whether a specific antisocial act occurred, is 
easily misused for that purpose by the jury); see also State v. Moore, 120 Idaho 743, 
745-46, 819 P.2d 1143, 1145-46 (1991) (recognizing that propensity evidence tends to 
corroborate the victim's testimony and enhance her credibility in the eyes of the jury), 
overruled on other grounds by State v. Grist, _ Idaho _, 205 P .3d 1185 (2009); State v. 
Tolman, 121 Idaho 899, 903-05, 828 P.2d 1304, 1308-10 (1992) (same), overruled on 
other grounds by Grist. 16 In light of this, there is a very real probability that the 
improperly allowed argument (and evidence) about the alleged "this time it's not my 
fault" statement made the difference between a conviction and an acquittal in this case. 
E. The District Court Erred In Concluding That Evidence That Mr. Pickens Had Said 
"This Time It's Not My Fault" Was Admissible 
Mr. Pickens contends that, in denying his motion for a mistrial, the district court 
implicitly ruled that the alleged "this time it's not my fault" statement was admissible 
evidence. The district court's complete ruling was as follows: 
Thank you, Counsel. 
I've listened to the arguments of both counsel. The Court does not 
believe that this is the type of statement that entitles the defense to a 
mistrial. The comment was apparently made at the scene. 
The Court would, if the defense wishes to, give an instruction to the 
jury that there is no issue here with regard to any prior violence between 
the defendant and the alleged victim. And, in fact, the Court will 
16 In Grist, the Idaho Supreme Court overruled Moore and Tolman only insofar as they 
allowed for admission of propensity evidence in certain classes of cases; it did not 
overrule Moore and Tolman insofar as they recognized that propensity evidence tends 
to corroborate the alleged victim's testimony and enhance her credibility. See Grist, 205 
P.3d at 1189-91. 
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specifically find that the entire thrust of the State's argument, from the 
Court's perspective and listening to it as not being one of the advocates, 
was this came out of nowhere. There had been no such problems before. 
And there was no issue that it had occurred before. She was taken totally 
by surprise by what happened. 
That was the focus of the opening statement of the State. I just 
don't believe that the one statement is sufficient to grant a mistrial where 
that's the entire focus of the State's opening statement. It's just the 
opposite from what the defense seems to feel. So I do not find the basis 
for declaring a mistrial based upon the statement. 
However, I will leave it up to the defense to determine whether or 
not it wishes a specific instruction from the Court, or whether it wishes to 
argue to the jury that it feels that's there. That even the State admits that 
this came out of nowhere. There was no prior history of violence between 
these people. 
(Tr. Vol. V, p.163, L.18 - p.164, L.20.) Because the district court failed to grasp the 
prejudice attendant to the alleged statement, 17 and because it somehow felt that the 
alleged statement was consistent with the "entire thrust" of the prosecutor's opening 
statement, it ignored the fact that the State failed to provide prior notice of its intent to 
use the alleged statement, and it seems to have concluded that the alleged statement 
was properly before the jury. (See Tr. Vol. V, p.163, L.18 - p.164, L.20.) Apparently as 
a consequence, defense counsel was induced not to object when two witnesses 
testified about the statement alleged to have been made by Mr. Pickens, further 
17 The district court only understood the statement to possibly pertain to past violent 
incidents between Mr. Pickens and Ms. Ortiz and, thus, saw .little prejudice to the 
statement because, of course, the State was willing to concede that there had been no 
violent incidents between the two of them in the past. What the district court did not 
understand was that another possible interpretation of the statement (and, indeed, a 
much more likely interpretation in light of the State's concession that there had been no 
violence between Mr. Pickens and Ms. Ortiz in the past) was that there had been a 
violent incident between Mr. Pickens and some other woman in the past. 
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reinforcing the highly prejudicial inference that Mr. Pickens had previously assaulted 
someone else.18 
18 The following exchange took place between the prosecutor and Ms. Ortiz: 
Q. . . . [W]as there a time that anybody else entered that bedroom that 
you were in? 
A. Yes. Um, his cousin Rachel, uh, came to the door. ... 
Q. In what tone was he talking to Rachel? 
A. Um, he was getting calmer. His voice was calm and-and he said to 
Rachel, "I didn't do anything this time. She attacked me." 
Q. And to be clear, he had never hit you before this incident; is that 
correct? 
A. No. I-he'd never even raised his voice to me. 
Q. And so did he do anything else, like point anything out to Rachel? 
A. . . . I believe I scratched him on the inside of his mouth and he took his 
lip down like this (indicating) to show Rachel where I had scratched him. 
(Tr. Vol. V, p.242, L.24 - p.244, L.15.) Later, when Rachel was testifying, the following 
exchange took place: 
Q. . . . Did he show any parts of his body? 
A. Um, just his lip. 
Q. When did he do that, when you were first peeking, or sometime later? 
A. When I went in, because I said that Cynthia wants to go home. And he 
said that he didn't do it this time, and he showed me his lip. 
Q. You just now said he said, "I didn't do it this time, and he pulled his lip 
down; is-
A. Yes. 
Q. ~that right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Is that true? 
A. Uh-huh. 
(Tr. Vol. V, p.415, L.22-p.416, L.22.) 
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Mr. Pickens asserts that this implied ruling was in error for two reasons. First, 
pursuant to I.R.E. 404(b), the district court should have never even reached a weighing 
of the probative value of the alleged statement against its prejudicial effect since the 
State neither provided prior notice of its intent to use the alleged statement, nor offered 
a reason for its failure to do so. Second, even if the State's failure to give notice could 
somehow be excused or ignored, an analysis of the alleged statement reveals that its 
probative value, if any, is substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect. 
Turning first to the notice question, the Idaho Rules of Evidence provide as 
follows: 
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove 
the character of a person in order to show that the person acted in 
conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, 
such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, 
identity, or absence of mistake or accident, provided that the prosecution in 
a criminal case shall file and serve notice reasonably in advance of trial, or 
during trial if the court excuses pretrial notice on good cause shown, of the 
general nature of any such evidence it intends to introduce at trial. 
I.R.E. 404(b) (emphasis added). Thus, regardless of the purpose for which the State 
proffers the evidence in question (unless it is offered solely to prove the character of the 
defendant, in which case it is strictly precluded), prior notice as to the general nature of 
the evidence, or demonstrated good cause for the failure to provide such prior notice, is 
a prerequisite to the admission of that evidence. State v. Sheldon, 145 Idaho 225, 230, 
178 P.3d 28, 33 (2008). In this case, however, it is quite clear that the State provided 
no prior notice of its intent to use the alleged "this time it's not my fault" statement at 
Mr. Pickens' trial. (See Tr., p.161, L.6 - p.162, L.22 (defense counsel asserting that no 
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notice was ever given, and the prosecutor not contesting that assertion 19); see generally 
R.) Nor did the State, despite an opportunity to do so, ever attempt to explain why it 
had failed to provide the required notice. (See Tr., p.161, L.24 - p.162, L.22 
(prosecutor's attempt to explain why the alleged statement was relevant to the State's 
case).) Accordingly, the district court erred in allowing the State to offer evidence 
tending to show a prior bad act, i.e., Mr. Picken's alleged statement that "this time it's 
not my fault." 
Even if the State's failure to give prior notice of its intent to use the alleged 
statement that "this time it's not my fault" was not sufficient basis to preclude use of that 
alleged statement, the statement nevertheless should have been precluded under the 
other provisions of Rule 404(b). Under Rule 404(b), there is a two-tiered analysis for 
determining the admissibility of "bad act" evidence. State v. Cross, 132 Idaho 667, 670, 
978 P.2d 227, 230 (1999). The court must first determine whether the evidence in 
question "is relevant to an issue other than character, guilt, or propensity," id., such as 
proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of 
mistake or accident, I.RE. 404(b). If the evidence is not relevant to an issue other than 
character, guilt, or propensity, it is inadmissible and the inquiry ends. See Cross, 132 at 
670, 978 P.2d at 230. However, if the evidence is relevant to some valid issue, the 
19 The prosecutor did assert that the alleged statement "is part of the police report. It's 
part of the grand jury transcript." (Tr. Vol. V, p.162, Ls.6-7.) However, the mere fact 
that the defense knew about the existence of the evidence can hardly substitute for the 
requirement that the prosecution provide advance notice of its intent to use that 
evidence at trial. See Sheldon, 145 Idaho at 229-31, 178 P.3d at 32-34 (finding 
reversible error where the State failed to give the mandatory notice under Rule 4044(b), 
even though the evidence at issue appeared in a police report and, thus, was 
presumably known to the defendant and his counsel). 
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court must then determine "whether under I.RE. 403 the probative value of that 
evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to the defendant." 
Id. 
In this case, even if one were to believe the State's seemingly pretextual 
argument for why it was offering the alleged statement, i.e., to show that Mr. Pickens 
was behaving strangely, that is not one of the potentially proper uses for "bad act" 
evidence identified in Rule 404(b). Moreover, even if it were a proper use of this type of 
"bad act" evidence, the fact that Mr. Pickens was behaving strangely was not relevant20 
and, even if it was relevant, any probative value was substantially outweighed by the 
risk that the jury would take it as evidence that Mr. Pickens had perpetrated a sexual 
and/or violent assault against someone else, and convict him based on the belief that 
that is the nature of Mr. Pickens' character, and he must have acted in conformity 
therewith. See generally I.RE. 404 (implicitly recognizing the substantial risk that a 
defendant may be judged on his past deeds, not the evidence relating to the matter at 
hand). Accordingly, the alleged statement that "this time it's not my fault" should never 
have been admitted at Mr. Pickens' trial and, for the reasons set forth in section 11(0)(2), 
above, the error in admitting that evidence was highly prejudicial and, thus, warrants a 
new trial. 
20 The prosecutor and the district court apparently felt this evidence bore upon 
Ms. Ortiz's surprise (see Tr., p.161, L.25 - p.162, L.5, p.164, Ls.6-7); however, the 
alleged victim's surprise is not a fact that is of consequence in this case and, thus, it is 
irrelevant. I.R.E. 401. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Pickens respectfully requests that this Court 
vacate his convictions and sentences, and remand his case for a new trial on the rape 
and kidnapping charges or, in the alternative, that it vacate his conviction and sentence 
for assault with the intent to commit a serious felony (rape). 
DATED this 29th day of May, 2009. 
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